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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXTERNAL DEBT:
A CASE STUDY OF LATIN AMERICA
HYPOTHESIS:
I believe that high external debt service requirements
act as a restraint on economic growth and aggravate
macroeconomic and microeconomic imbalances within an
economy.

Large future repayments act as a tax on

investment, both foreign and domestic, encourage capital
flight, and decrease savings. Inflation increases due to
currency devaluations that result from the promotion of
exp<?rt export goods and services in international markets to
repay the debt and uncertainty in the domestic financial
markets.

Austerity measures, designed to correct fiscal

problems, decrease public expenditures and private
consumption.

The final result is a lack of economic

growth and a decline in the country's standard of living.
The goal of this thesis is to explain the effects of
high external debt on the Latin American region during the
late 1970's and throughout the decade of the 1980's.

The

large debt had a negative economic effect on Latin America
and placed both the countries involved and the commercial
banking industry in danger of financial crisis.

This thesis

explains the effects of official United States government
and multilateral banking policy on the debt crisis and the
actions that three individual countries to resolve their

economic imbalances.

The analysis enclosed does not claim

that 100% of the negative effects were caused by high debt,
only that a strong positive correlation exists between the
high debt and the negative effects.
In Chapter 1, I discuss the regional effects that a
decade of high outward transfers, combined with required
internal adjustment programs, had on the primary economic
indicators: GDP; investment; inflation; and employment.

In

addition, I examine the effects of the debt on consumption,
income distribution, and inequality.
Chapter 2 is a chronological guide to the debt crisis.
It is necessary to explain how the crisis occurred in order
to understand the actions taken by the Latin American region
to resolve the crisis.

Each of the primary players in the

debt crisis is examined and the interests that they
represented explained.
In Chapter 3, I show how Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
rejected the IMF austerity plans and instituted reform
programs designed to correct their economic imbalances,
streamline the public sector, bring inflation under control,
and provide consumer goods and services for their
populations.

At one point, all three countries informally

suspended interest payments on their loans to focus
attention on domestic problems and to force their creditors

to restructure the outstanding debts.

Mexico and Argentina

have been successful, Brazil has not.
Finally, in chapter 4, I discuss alternative solutions,
both theoretical and applied, that are available to the
debtor and creditor countries to help resolve the current
debt problem.

CHAPTER 1
THE LOST DECADE:
The 1980's is considered a "lost decade" for Latin
America.

The region's $400 billion debt set in motion a

series of events that led to the deterioration of economic
conditions within Latin America.

The enormous debt overhang

required 4-5% of it's economic output

(GDP) to be

transferred annually to service the $400 billion debt.

On

average, the region's combined income from exports totaled
$95 billion, and interest payments amounted to $40 billion:
a debt service ratio of 42 percent. 1 In Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico the proportion was even higher.
The high debt service-to-exports ratio impacted the credit
rating of debtor countries and their ability to obtain more
loans.

(Chart 1.1)

In addition, with the primary focus of

the economy on export production (to facilitate debt service
payments) the region's ability to withstand external changes
or to implement necessary internal adjustments was
handicapped.
To compete in the international export market,
countries had to refocus their priorities from domestic
needs and invest their available capital in export

1

Debt Service Ratio: Interest + Principal payments
Export of Goods and Services

production.

National currencies were devalued to make

export goods more attractive and import levels were reduced
to conserve the foreign capital required to purchase raw
materials and service the debt.
Chart 1.1
DEBT AS A % OF EXPORTS
| ARGENTINA
| BRAZIL
| MEXICO

1980
272.4%
304.3%
259.2%

PEAK
695.5%
452.6%
422.7%

| AVERAGE
176.6%
| (MIDDLE INCOME)
| Source: World Bank.

(YEAR)
(1987)
(1986)
(1986)

350.3

1991
430.0%
333.7%
224.1%

(1987)

286.7%

(The Economist 1993, 14)

|
|
|
|
|

|

The Latin American nations actually grew poorer in
terms of per capita GDP and investment.
declined between 1980 and 1990.

Regional GDP growth

By 1988, the region's per

capita gross domestic product was 7% below the 1980 figure
(Devlin 1989, 218).

1 Investment, as a share of the GDP,

fell from nearly 24% in the late 1970's to 16% from 1983-89
■^The figures for the three case studies:
GDP GROWTH
1973-80
1980-90
1989
1990
% Change

Argentina
2.1
-0.5
-4.6
-0.7
-2.8%

Brazil
6.4
2.8
3.6
-4.0
-10.4%

**See Appendix A for more figures.

Mexico
6.2
1.0
3.1
3.9
-2.3%

(Williamson 1992, 347) . 1 The decline in investment can be
partially explained by the deteriorating internal economic
(and political)

conditions within Latin America.

Domestically, wealthy citizens moved their money to safer
havens outside of Latin America in the form of capital
flight.

Estimates show that the total amount of capital

flight that left Latin American equaled the increase in the
external debt (Economist 1993).

(Chart 1.2)

Direct foreign

investment also declined in response to the growing economic
problems of the region.

The lack of available capital

impeded economic growth by handicapping investments and
decreased the government's ability to borrow against the
investment capital.
Chart 1.2
CAPITAL FLIGHT ASSETS
ARGENTINA
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
MEXICO
PERU
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA

$46
$ 2
$31
$ 2
$ 7
$84
$ 2
$ 4
$50

(1987)

BILLION
BILLION
BILLION
BILLION
BILLION
BILLION
BILLION
BILLION
BILLION

% OF DEBT
111%
178%
46%
17%
103%
114%
27%
109%
240%

Sources: Flight Capital, Morgan Stanley as cited in
"The International Economy," July/August 1989.
Debt,
World Debt Tables, 1988-89 edition.
(Bulow 1990, 37)
* * * *

^-See Appendix B for investment figures.

Inflation rates in Latin America rose sharply in the
period from 1980 to 1988.

Argentina and Brazil ended the

1980's in severe hyper-inflation.

(Chart 1.3)

A partial

explanation of the inflation can be found in the short term
liquidity problems experienced by several of the Latin
American countries.

The decrease in investment coupled with

the emphasis on exports left the Latin American countries
unable to repay their short-term loans.
obligations, they printed more money.

To meet their
They used the rising

inflation to finance the monetary expansion, but without
increasing reserves or current account holdings.

By the

mid-1980's, double digit inflation was common in the non-oil
producing countries. The inflation eroded real wages and
purchasing power and exacerbated the macroeconomic problems
within the countries.

Chart 1.3
INFLATION ( CONSUMER PRICE INDEX) % PER YEAR
1965-73
1973-80
1980-88
1989
1990

Argentina
24.6
182.1
328.2
4923.0
1344.0

Brazil
22.7
43.0
287.3
1764.9
1650.0

Mexico
4.6
20.3
73.8
19.7
29.9

Unemployment figures reached as high as 50% during the
1980's.

In Mexico, the labor force increased by 4 million,

yet no new jobs were created between 1981 and 1984.

Between

1982 and 1985, the public sector lost 780,000 jobs and the
private sector lost 250,000 jobs due to cuts in the
government budget.

Informal sector employment and

underemployment rose 39% between 1980 and 1985 and many
households held additional jobs to make ends meet.
Approximately 50% of the region's population earned less
than minimum wage and real wage rates dropped an average
of 16% between 1980 and 1985 (Roddick 1988, 85)

(Chart 1.3) .

Chart 1.4
MINIMUM WAGE (1970=100%)
|
|
|
|
|

ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CHILE
MEXICO
VENEZUELA

1979
46.8
99.4
75.8
117 .7
64.9

1980
55. 0
101.7
76.0
110.0
106. 9

1981
53. 6
100.6
75.3
110 .7
92.0

1982
56.8
101.1
73.9
99. 9
84.0

1983
84 .1
89.3
59.5
80.4
79.0

| Source: ILO-PREALC, Mas Alla de la Crisis, Santiago,
| 1985. (Roddick 1988 , 90)

|
|
|
|
|
|
|

Austerity measures, necessary to correct fiscal
imbalances, required the elimination of many public
services.

Health and education expenditures were reduced

and infrastructure spending halted. Subsidies were slashed,

which decreased consumer purchasing power already impacted
by bouts of hyper-inflation and high interest rates.

(Chart

1.4)
Chart 1.5
TOTAL CONSUMPTION (SHAKE OF GDP)
(PRIVATE/GOVERNMENT)
1973
1980
1988
1989
1990

Argentina
79.2
(67.3/11.8)
79.4
(66.2/13.2)
79.9
(69.4/10.5)
83.0
(77.3/5.7)
84 .4
(80.5/3.9)

Brazil
78.0
(57.1/10.9)
78.9
(67.5/10.4)
73.3
(69.8/9.2)
71.7
(61.2/12.1)
77 .4
(59.8/11.9)

Mexico
79.9
(71.6/8.2)
75.1
(65.1/10.0)
76 .7
(68.4/8.3)
76.3
(65.8/10.3)
81.8
(70.4/11.5)

Standards of living declined during the 1980's.

The

middle class and poor were hit the hardest by decreases in
GDP and real wages, coupled with soaring inflation rates.
The percentage of the population living in poverty increased
from 40% to 44% and unequal income distributions further
exacerbated the problem.

Inequality rose between different

sectors of the population with the upper 20% controlling
approximately 50% of the total income.

(Chart 1.5)

However, the numbers do not show the complete effects of the
economic problem.

Many families only escaped the poverty

statistics by working more hours or taking on additional
jobs.

Chart 1.6
| INCOME DISTRIBUTION--SELECTED MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES
I
(1988)
I
| COUNTRY
I
|
|
I
I
I
|
|

|

% OF INCOME RECEIVED BY:
GINI CONCENTRATION |
LOWEST 40%
HIGHEST 20%
RATIO |

Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Costa Rica
Mexico
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

I United States

14 .1
8.1
12.7
11. 6
9.9
12 .9
14.3
13.9

50.3
62.6
53.0
56.5
57 .7
51. 9
47.4
50.6

.442
.569
.469
.485
.523
.458
.423
.441

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

15.7

41.9

.369

|

| Source: World Bank, "World D jvelopment Report 1985), pp |
| 228-229.
(Gillis 1992, 76)

■^Gini Concentration Ratio: 0= perfect equality
1= perfect inequality

CHAPTER 2

ORIGINS OF THE DEBT CRISIS
During the 1970's, commercial banks recycled billions
of OPEC dollars in the form of loans to the Third World
countries.

The enormous flow of revenues generated from the

increased world price of oil forced international banks to
scramble to find new borrowers.

The banks granted generous

terms: longer maturities, longer grace periods, and lower
origination costs which made the loans attractive to the
Latin American borrowers.

As long as growth remained high,

interest rates were low, and export revenues remained
constant, the countries could borrow without increasing
their debt service ratio. External debt in the region rose
from less than $100 billion in 1972 to more than $600
billion in 1981 (Economist 1993).
However, the banks overlooked the region's history of
loan default during the Great Depression and hastily issued
the new loans based on the "stability" of the individual
governments as guarantors of both public and private debt.
The banks also ignored the instability inherent in Latin
American governments and the military dictators agreed to
pay variable rates of interest based on the U.S. prime
lending rate--not fixed rates.

Interest rates were low in

the 1970's and it was not until the 1980's, when interest
rates rose sharply, that the Latin American countries
realized that an increase of 1.5% in the prime rate added
approximately 4.5 billion dollars to the debt (Burns 1990,
319) .
The second oil-price shock in the early 1980's signaled
the end of the honeymoon between the creditors and the
debtors. The governments of the industrial world reversed
their policies and tightened monetary policy to combat high
inflation.

At the same time, the United States shifted to a

practice of supply side economics.

World capital became

enormously expensive. Interest rates in the United States
rose as the government and other U.S. debtors tried to
attract money from the rest of the world.

The initial rise

in the U.S. prime rate cost the debtor countries $20 billion
in interest between 1980 and 1981.

This coincided with a

deterioration in the terms of trade which cost them a
further $79 billion and a fall in the real volume of
exports because of the recession in the West.

The final

figure over two years was $141 billion--all externally
produced (Roddick 1988, 135).
The Latin American countries faced an additional
crisis. They could not cover short-term obligations due the
creditors without more loans and the International banking
community refused to loan more money to the debtor nations.

When the Latin American governments ran into financial
difficulties and could not finance their budgets and current
account deficits, they resorted to printing money to cover
short-term obligations.

This monetary expansion fueled

inflation. Savings and investment decreased.

A drop in

foreign demand for exports coupled with reduced domestic
consumption (due to the inflation rate and unattainability
of financing options) further decreased government revenues
and made debt servicing impossible (Economist 1993) . The
debt crisis had accelerated.
In 1982, the International banking community found
itself in a panic when Mexico announced that it could no
longer service its debt.

A default by Argentina, Brazil,

Chile, or Mexico would threaten the solvency of the banking
industry and potentially cause several of the large U.S.
banks to collapse. The IMF stepped in to forestall the
threat of immanent default

(or repudiation).

It arranged

deals using its own money to encourage reluctant banks to
continue their flow of lending while borrowers implemented
new structural policies

(Economist 1993).

U.S. Government

response, designed to protect the banking industry, insisted
on full debt repayment.

"Debt Management" and IMF austerity

measures forced recalcitrant debtors to continue debt
service payments in order to receive new monies from the

commercial and multilateral lenders.

It was not until 1989,

when the United States government introduced the Brady
Plan,1 that the idea of full debt recovery was abandoned.
This new approach accepted that the countries could not
achieve economic recovery without debt reduction and
rescheduling of both commercial and multilateral debt.

IMF /WORLD BANK
The IMF and the World Bank are the principal lenders to
developing counties. Both face the daunting task of making
loans to countries that other lending institutions consider
not creditworthy.

The primary role of the World Bank is to

finance economic development programs in Third World
countries.

The IMF loans money to stabilize domestic

currencies to those countries facing a balance of payments
crisis.
With the advent of the debt crisis, the IMF was "cast
in the dual role of crisis manager and policeman"
1988, 201).

(Roddick

In this new role, the IMF has become the last

resort for many of the Third world countries.

IMP4 approval

is required before the World Bank, multilateral, bilateral,
or commercial lenders will issue new loans to heavily

1See Chapter 2--Banks, for a full explanation of the
Brady plan.

indebted countries. The IMF provides credits equal to the
balance of the country's gold deposit or foreign exchange,
or twenty-five percent of its initial quota to member
nations with balance of payment problems.

When a country

needs to borrow in excess of the reserve amount, they must
agree to criteria designed to promote currency and price
stability.

Thus, "Fund Conditionality" preserves the

revolving nature of the IMF program but, requires debtor
countries to impose harsh austerity measures and create
an export-oriented economy to secure new loans (Nafziger
1993, 101).
There are four basic requirements to IMF adjustment: 1)
the government must practice "demand management"--a
reduction in the consumption of all kinds of goods and
services; 2) public spending must be reduced which means
fewer health and education services and the elimination of
government subsidies; 3) wage ceilings must be imposed and
taxes and interest rates increased; and 4) the country's
currency must be devalued to boost the attractiveness of the
country's exports on the world market (George 1988, 3).

In

short, the IMF requires a country to create a recession to
meet debt payments.

In many of the Latin American

countries, IMF austerity undermines fragile democracies by
undercutting support of the governments.

With a tradition

of military intervention at the least economic provocation,

Latin American government leaders have an added risk factor
when enacting reforms.

They must find a way to resolve the

current debt servicing quagmire, maintain national dignity,
achieve economic progress, and remain in power.

BANKS:
In 1982, the U.S. government's response was designed to
prevent the wholesale collapse of the banking industry that
would have occurred if even one of the major Latin American
countries defaulted on its loans.

By March of 1988, the

banks had decreased their exposure rate from 124% to 57.7%.
In a movement initiated by Citicorp in 1987, the banks
increased their loan loss reserves to cover approximately
50% of their LDC portfolios.

Therefore, by early 1988, the

potential banking crisis had been averted.

Chart 2.1
EXPOSURE OF U.S. BANKS IN DEBTOR COUNTRIES
(PERCENTAGE OF BANK CAPITAL)
End 1982

End 1986

End 1988

9 MAJOR
DEVELOPED
LATIN AMERICA

287.7%
176.5%

153.9%
1 1 0 .2 %

108.0%
83. 6%

ALL OTHER
DEVELOPED
LATIN AMERICA

116.0%
78.6%

55.0%
39.7%

32 .2%
2 1 .8%

29.0
41. 6

46.7
69.4

55. 8
79.8

TOTAL (IN BILLIONS)
9 MAJOR
ALL OTHER

| Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination
| Council, "Country Exposure Lending Survey", April 25,
I 1983, April 24,1987, April 12, 1989.
(Sachs 1989, 392)

|
|
.|

Today, all of the major U.S. banks have significantly
raised their loan loss reserves against possible Latin
American losses.

(Chart 2.2).

In 1989 the chairman of the

FDIC in a statement to Congress affirmed this new stability
and acknowledged that even if six of the major debtors were
to completely wipe out their debt it "wouldn't mean a penny
of damage to the FDIC"

(Sachs, 1990).

The blame for the debt crisis should fall equally on
the creditors and the debtors.

The banks are in the profit

making business--they had to recycle the OPEC deposits to
ensure enough profit to cover administrative costs and
interest payments on the deposits.

The banks assumed that

the loans were guaranteed by credible governments

(a very

dubious assumption in many cases) and issued several
questionable loans.

The Latin American countries saw the

opportunities afforded by the loans for capital and social
improvements and took advantage of the money.

Their

economies were expanding and debt service ratios were small.
The oil shocks were considered to be temporary and
structural changes were not enacted.
Where did the loan money go?

Governments took

advantage of the loans to maintain the existing government
services and upgrade their infrastructure.

The low interest

rates provided cheap investment dollars and low inflation
and future expectations of continued export revenues
prompted large-scale borrowing.

Yet, the loans were not

used to expand or create industry.

Instead, many

of the countries used the money to cover existing budgetary
shortages and improve their infrastructure: roads, ports,
government buildings, parks, dams, and power plants.
Dictators financed build-ups in military strength and
corrupt politicians and businessmen sent billions of dollars
to personal bank accounts in New York and Geneva.
Neither party anticipated the recessionary effects on
Latin American trade and the region's inability to repay the
loans. However, when the situation became a "crisis", the
banks were not held accountable for their role in causing

the crisis and the burden of the crisis fell on the debtor
countries. Through the 1980's, with government and
multilateral backing, the banks were allowed to continue the
policy of full debt recovery and force compliance from the
debtor countries-despite statistics that show that in terms
of net transfers, the debt was repaid several times over,
even allowing for inflation and for the repayment of a what
was considered a "normal" interest rate (Branford 1).
In 1982, to forestall against an immediate
international crisis and to protect the banks against
possible failure, the IMF and the World Bank stepped in to
mediate the crisis.

Under the Reagan administration, the

IMF was subjected to a conditionality freeze (Roddick 1988,
42).

This restricted the IMF to using only "conditionality"

funds to bail out Latin America and assign longer repayment
terms.

Non-compliance by the IMF to these edicts would

result in a U.S. veto of the proposed loan.
U.S. law worked in favor of the banks.

In addition,

Under U.S. law,

loans on which interest had not been paid within 90 days
were legally non-performing.

This meant that interest

payments could not be credited to a bank's account.

After

six months, loans became value impaired and the full value
of the loan could not be counted among the banks assets.
forestall against potential losses, the government used a

To

variety of means to force reluctant debtors into paying
their arrears.

Emergency loans were issued by the IMF and

World Bank for International Settlements, export-import
credits were frozen, shipments of basic goods were detained
(Argentina was threatened with the freezing of insulin
shipments) , and negotiations for rescheduling of debt were
threatened to be sidelined or vetoed if cooperation was not
immediate.

As long as the banking industry had the full

attention of the U.S. Government, their profits were
virtually assured.
The banks have exercised a monopoly power in their
dealings with Latin American debt--all sanctioned by the
creditor governments and multi-lateral institutions--and as
profit-maximizers were reluctant to give up any possible
remaining gains.

In 1985, Citicorp posted $285 million in

pre-tax profits from Latin America and the Caribbean, a full
25% of their pre-tax earnings.

New loans carried a risk

premium of 0.5-1% and a commission of 1% of the total.
Floating interest rates were adjusted every six months,
penalties are written into the contracts for early
repayment, and banks often refused to renegotiate existing
loans, preferring instead to issue new loans with shorter
terms at higher variable rates (plus more fees).

The

banking industry also scored a major coup by forcing the
Latin American counties to guarantee private sector debt

(issued by Latin American banks backed by U.S. investment
dollars).

The nations now had to keep the non-profitable

banks in business or risk cancellation of new loans.
When Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile all
temporarily suspended interest payments, the United States
Government finally tried to institute policy reforms.
first plan was the Baker plan in 1985.

The

It proposed

rescheduling of current debt payments, but only for those
countries already making their payments.

It also encouraged

the banking industry to become further involved in the
region with new loans and renegotiation packages.
was not successful.

The plan

The banks balked at the idea of

becoming further enmeshed at a time when they were
desperately trying to decrease their Latin American
exposure. They also refused to consider any kind of a
blanket proposal that encouraged restructuring of existing
loans.

To that point, all renegotiation had been handled on

a case-by-case basis to try to discourage a unified movement
by the debtor countries to reduce the debt servicing
payments. The Brady plan introduced in 1989, suggested that
in exchange for guarantees that some of the debt would be
repaid, the banks would forgive a major portion of the Latin
American loans.

The remaining debt would be guaranteed by

conditionality.

The implication the World Bank and IMF and

subjected to strict IMF was that if the banks were willing
to give up the myth of full debt recovery, they would at
least recover whatever the countries were able to
realistically pay.

The plan was accepted, in part, by the

banks who were at least willing to feign cooperation rather
than risk losing the government support on delinquent
payments.

Mexico and Costa Rico were early recipients of

the benefits of the Brady plan and both Argentina and Brazil
were able to negotiate somewhat better terms on new loans.
U.S. POLICY:
According to John Williamson, the Washington ^ agenda
regarding Latin American adjustment includes: Macroeconomic
prudence by the Latin American countries; outward-oriented
trade policies; and domestic liberalization.

Within this

consensus, policy-makers address the following areas of
concern:

1) Fiscal deficits--There is a broad agreement

that large and sustained fiscal deficits are a primary
source of macroeconomic dislocation in the forms of
inflation, payments deficits, and capital flight.

An

operational budget in excess of around 1-2% of GDP is
considered prima facie evidence of policy failure.

The

^Washington is defined as: IMF; World Bank; U.S.
Executive Branch; Inter-American Development Bank (IDB);
Members of Congress; and think tanks concerned with economic
policy. Source: Williamson 1992, 7

policy recommendation is to cut public expenditures in the
forms of subsidies, education and health, and public
investment. 2) Tax reform--Experts view increasing
taxes to raise revenue as inferior to cutting expenditures.
However, tax evasion is widespread in Latin America and the
tax base is very narrow.

The policy recommendation is to

widen the tax base and establish moderate marginal tax
rates.

3) Interest rates-- Interest rates should be market

determined and should be positive.

4) Exchange rate--The

exchange rate should be market determined and competitive to
promote a rate of export growth.

Stability is important and

countries should promote outward-oriented trade policies
rather than import substitution policies.

5) Foreign direct

investment--The removal of restrictions on foreign
investment will increase capital flows through direct
investment, portfolio investment, and debt-equity swaps.

6)

Privatization--Privatizing inefficient industries will
decrease public expenditures and generate additional
revenue.

7) Deregulation--Deregulation will promote

competition.

8) Property rights--Legislation is required to

establish secure property rights.
The United States plays a large role in Latin American
economic affairs.

The U.S. is the region's largest market

for export goods, has over $80 billion in investments,
provides economic and military aid of over $300 million, and

uses aid to influence political events by withholding
assistance.

Politically, the U.S. has traditionally

intervened in Latin American affairs and historically
considers the region an extended "sphere of influence."
Consequently, U.S. policy initiatives directly impact Latin
American interests and at times pre-empt or override
sovereign policies.
At the advent of the debt crisis, the United States
used it's majority position in the multilateral lending
institutions to protect U.S. banking interests at the
expense of the debtor nations.

The policy of "Debt

Repayment" assumed full remittance of all principal and
interest payments due to the commercial and multilateral
institutions.
By 1985, Washington realized that high debt service
placed limitations on Latin American growth and demand for
U.S. imports.

U.S. Secretary of Treasury, James Baker

proposed a plan to increase commercial and multilateral
lending to the highly indebted countries to ease temporary
liquidity problems and allowing them to continue debt
service.

The plan did not reduce or write-off debt, nor did

it lower interest rates.

According to Nafziger,

the Baker plan stressed saving the U.S. banks at the
expense of the IMF, World Bank, multilateral, and
Japanese creditors, was under funded, and emphasized
middle-income countries.
The plan did forestall a major

write-off of Third World debt and prevented the debtors
from forming a cartel.
The plan also "enabled the top creditor banks to reduce
their LDC exposure, so they could boycott reschedulings and
new money packages and insist on full LDC servicing."
(Nafziger 180-81) However, the Brady plan, introduced in
1989, called for debt service reduction and new money
packages on a voluntary case-by-case basis.

This called for

commercial banks to reduce their LDC exposure through
voluntary debt reduction or write offs.

Also, the IMF and

World Bank were to set aside $12 billion for discounted
buybacks, with $12 billion matching funds from the
commercial banks and $4.5 billion from the Japanese.

The

Brady plan is still the primary official policy toward Latin
America.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDIES
This section irs-=aF compares the efforts undertaken by
Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina to reduce their debt and
restore economic stability to their countries.

Each of the

three countries experienced different paths to their debt
crisis and yet all three have chosen similar methods to
resolve the problem.

Argentina and Mexico are in a good

position to begin the twenty-first century.

Brazil has not

resolved her problems and faces difficulties restoring
growth and stability.
Mexico shows a history of positive growth, low amounts
of "social" expenditures, and moderate inflation.
Expansionary government practices in the 1970's came to an
end in 1982 when rising world interest rates, falling oil
prices, and creditor's refusal to roll over short-term debt
precipitated a financial crisis.
Both Argentina and Brazil have experienced negative
growth and periods of hyper-inflation.

Argentina's history

of military dictatorships and Peronist-style populism left
the democratically elected Alfonsin and Menem governments
with large public sectors operating in a deficit status and
an enormous debt overhang.

Wasteful spending in the 1970's

and early 1980's (to finance existing institutions, build

projects for the rich, and fight a war with England) did not
leave Argentina with a foundation upon which to initiate
economic recovery.
Unlike Argentina, Brazil has the tools for economic
recovery.

In 1964, the Brazilian military government and

civilian elite envisioned turning Brazil into a world power
commensurate with its size and abundant natural resources.
To accomplish this enormous economic build-up, the
government borrowed heavily counting on a trade surplus to
cover the new debt. To fuel continued growth, Brazil
continued to borrow heavily--having to deposit the money
abroad when there was no use for it at home.

Brazil showed

record levels of GDP growth and industrial output and the
economy produced enough export goods to offset the growing
debt. In 1983, when the balance of payments turned negative,
Brazil was left with the largest foreign debt in Latin
America.

The rapid build-up created a two class society

rife with government corruption and concentrated power in
the hands of a select few at the expense of the general
population.

In 1985, public dissatisfaction with the

IMF-induced recession forged a protest movement that lead to
direct elections and put an end to two decades of military
rule.

Long standing public distrust of government and

lingering corruption from the two decades of rapid growth

still limits the current leaders' ability to enforce
unpopular economic reforms.

MEXICO
The announcement in 1982 was the result of more than a
decade of expansionistic import-substitution policies.

The

Mexican economy was overvalued and dependent on oil revenues
to subsidize growth.

When world oil prices dropped, Mexico

faced a balance of payments problem.

Short-term debt to

international commercial banks could not be repaid and
Mexico could not procure new loans.

The International

banking community agreed to negotiate only when Mexico
threatened to default.
To prevent future liquidity problems, the Mexican
Government initiated reforms to stabilize the economy.

The

peso was devalued, public expenditures were cut, and the
government nationalized the banks.

Fiscal conditions

improved yet, the economy did not grow.

High inflation

persisted and a lack of public confidence in the
government's ability to manage the economy led to increased
capital flight and decreased investment.
In 1987, the Mexican leadership implemented an Economic
Solidarity Pact

(PACTO) between government, labor, farming

and business representatives.

PACTO's goal was to sharply

reduce the existing triple digit inflation.

This was to be

accomplished by tightening fiscal and monetary policy,
implementing structural reforms, reducing credit subsidies,
privatizing 831 small public enterprises, and rapid trade
liberalization.

The government also initiated incomes

policies and froze minimum wages, public sector tariffs, and
prices of basic goods.

The nominal exchange rate against

the dollar was modified and inflation was reduced from 159
percent in 1987 to 52 percent in 1988.

This abrupt

disinflation was accomplished without a recession and was
accompanied by a growth rate of 1.1 percent.
In 1988 the newly elected Salinas Government renewed
the PACTO agreement, now called PECE (Pact for Stability and
Economic Growth).

PECE relaxed the controls on the prices,

wages, and the exchange rate.

The federal deficit was

reduced by implementing tax reforms and slashing
expenditures.

Privatization of commercial banks, TELEMEX

(the state owned telephone company) , and the steel industry
increased government revenues by over $5.9 billion (U.S.
Congress 1992, 549).

Also, transportation, shipping, and

agriculture were deregulated to further reduce the role of
government in the economy.
In 1989, under the Brady Plan, the government initiated
negotiations to restructure the external debt (approximately
$104 billion).

$22.8 billion of the debt was exchanged for

bonds at a fixed rate of 6.25 % and $19.8 billion was
"bought-back" on the discount market at a rate of 35 % of
its original value.

This debt reduction resulted in a

decrease of nearly $4 billion a year in the net transfer of
payments from Mexico to her creditors in order to service
the debt (a drop from 5.75 % of GDP to 2.43 % of GDP).
Mexico's continued ability to meet her debt obligations has
increased the confidence of investors and creditors.

This

has resulted in large capital inflows and the reopening of
international credit markets to Mexican borrowers at
progressively more favorable terms
550) .

(U.S. Congress 1992,

Private investment more than doubled after the

Mexican government announced that it would allow up to 100%
foreign ownership of Mexican industries.

Salinas continued

to make structural adjustments to correct long-term economic
imbalances.

Deregulation laws were passed to return the

control of the banks and oil industry to the private sector,
the stock market was opened to foreign investment, and
interest rates were deregulated.

After years of import

substitution policies and protectionism, Mexico liberalized
her trade policies. The average tariff rate dropped from 45%
to 9% and trade tripled from 1987 to 1991.

The success of

the free trade policy inspired the North Atlantic Free Trade
Association (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada.

Standardization and anti-trust laws have brought Mexican
business practices more in line with her NAFTA partners. In
addition, Mexico has taken an unprecedented step for a Third
world nation and requested admittance to the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD).

Political reform has been limited to agricultural
reform. In the late 1980's, when Mexico suddenly become a
net importer of basic food products, major agricultural
adjustment was required.

Article VII of the Constitution,

guaranteeing land grants to peasants in the form of communal
farms, had created small inefficient ejidos employing 23% of
the population but only producing 7% of GDP (Economist 1993,
12).

Article VII was removed and private property rights

were established allowing land to be sold, rented, or
pledged as collateral.

To date, electoral reform has not

been addressed and the PRI

(Mexico's legal political party)

still maintains exclusive control of Mexican government.
The monopoly of power by Salinas has been beneficial to the
reform process and has assured continuity in philosophy and
policy that many other Latin American countries, such as
Brazil, have yet to achieve.
The outlook for Mexico's continued economic success
looks good.

GDP growth for 1993 is estimated to be between

5-6%, inflation between 8-10%, and the budget shows a
surplus. However, problem areas still need to be addressed.

The inflation rate is too high compared to the United
States, foreign investment is largely portfolio rather than
direct, and the savings rate is considered too low to
sustain a 5-6% growth rate without more foreign direct
investment. Imports are beginning to outpace exports due to
years of pent up consumer demand and threaten to create a
trade balance problem.
Socially, the gap between the rich and the poor has
widened.

The poor suffered disproportionately when the

Mexican economy did not grow between 1982 and 1988.

During

this time, GDP per head decreased by 2%, inflation peaked at
100%, and real wages decreased by 3% (as wage rates were
held artificially low to facilitate competitive export
prices) . By 1988, the lowest 40% of the population received
only 9.9% of the total income while the top 20% controlled
57.7%.

Mexico's GINI coefficient of .523 was one of the

highest in Latin America.

In an attempt to help the poor

rural peasants, Salinas used $16 billion gained from
privatization to finance a rural improvement program.

The

Solidarity program provided water, sewage treatment, lights,
clinic, and schools to the rural population.

Yet, 70%

percent of the country's four million poor people live in
the countryside on small communal ejidos eking out a
subsistence living. The average Mexican has only a sixth

grade education.
The continuing challenge for the Mexican Government is
to provide social spending to reduce the gap between the
rich and the poor, train and educate the Mexican population
to be competitive within the NAFTA partnership, maintain
current growth, increase foreign investment, diversify the
manufacturing and service base, and to attempt to accomplish
this without setting off an inflationary spiral.

ARGENTINA
Argentina began the reform process in the midst of a
bout of hyperinflation.

When Carlos Menem assumed the

presidency in 1989, inflation was running between 35% and
40% a month.

Forty years of state intervention and deficit

spending had produced instability, discouraged domestic
savings and investment which led to slow growth, and
produced a massive debt overhang, nearly 70% of GDP.

Menem

immediately passed legislation designed to cut the
government fiscal deficit and began the process of
deregulation and privatization.

Subsidies were suspended,

central bank credit was reduced in the private sector, and
the base of the value added tax was widened.

The government

also fixed the exchange rate and enacted wage freezes.
In January 1990, to forestall immanent hyperinflation,

the government forcibly converted virtually all domestic
commercial bank time deposits, and a majority of the central

bank and treasury's outstanding austral debt into 10-year
dollar dominated Treasury Exchange Bonds

(BONEX).

measure temporarily stopped the hyperinflation.

This

At the

beginning of February 1990, unexpected price adjustments and
persistent rumors caused the money demand to collapse and
spun the economy into a second period of hyperinflation
(Trends 1991, 16) .
In early March of 1990 the government responded with
structural and fiscal reform measures. Employment in the
public sector was reduced, payments were suspended for sixty
days on contracts, the banking sector was prohibited from
providing any type of public financing, and tax collection
measures were stepped up.

Inflation dropped from 70-80% a

month from the first quarter to 4-6% a month by December.
In 1991 the Congress passed the Convertability Law
linking the exchange rate to the dollar.

The Austral is

convertible at a fixed rate of 10,000 Austral to the dollar.
By law, the monetary base must be 100% backed by gold and
foreign currency reserves.

Under the new monetary

guidelines, inflation fell to less than 2% a month and
interest rates dropped from 100% to 8% per annum.

The

sudden availability of domestic credit coupled with price
cuts on consumer goods fueled a modest economic recovery.

The economic recovery was accompanied by structural
changes.

Argentina privatized two television stations, the

national telephone company, Aerolineas Argentinas, long
distance cargo lines, the largest distributor of
electricity, and several maritime industries.

Efforts to

streamline and improve the efficiency of revenue
collection--traditionally a weakness in the Argentine
economic system--have been enacted. In October 1991, Menem
announced the complete deregulation of the economy.

This

move ended industry-wide bargaining agreements, eliminated
federal regulatory agencies, cut export taxes, and
encouraged imported goods

(Dayton Daily 1991, 2A) .

While the government focused its attention on reducing
the domestic deficit problem, the external debt fell into
arrears.

At the end of 1991, the outstanding commercial

debt stood at $7-8 billion in interest payments and $25
billion in principal. Argentina used $1 billion earned from
privatizing

the gas industry to buy back $3.5 billion of

her commercial debt on the discount market.

In March 1992,

the IMF granted a three year extended debt facility of $3
billion.

A month later, foreign bank creditors agreed to

reduce the debt (including the $8 billion in arrears) by $8
billion.

After the rescheduling, Argentina's debt stood at

$62 billion.

In a February 1993 interview, Carlos Menem spoke
optimistically about economic conditions in Argentina and
his future expectations.

Argentina privatized the railroad,

natural gas, water, and steel industries.

Growth was 6% in

1992 and is estimated to be around 6.5% for 1993.

Inflation

was 17.5% in 1992 and predicted to drop between 5-9% for
1993.

There is a budget surplus and over $12 billion in

gold and foreign currency reserves.

The average tariff rate

is at 9%, down from 40%, and the unemployment rate is less
than 5%. Menem foresees the new role of the state to be
substantially reduced to provide education, public health,
justice, and security.

He emphasizes the need to increase

technical training to compete with First World countries,
and he would also like to negotiate a trade agreement with
the United States or perhaps join NAFTA.

BRAZIL
Social conditions in Brazil deteriorated during the
1980's.

Per capital income decreased to 10% below the 1980

level and cumulative inflation (1980-1990) was greater than
50 billion percent

(Business Week, 1993).

In 1993, the

cruzeiro lost an average of 1% of its value every 36 hours.
Despite Brazil's status as the eighth largest market based
economy, 70% of the population lives in poverty and the

average GDP growth rate of 2.3% during the 1980's barely
outpaced the population growth rate of 2%.

Brazil ranks

third in the world in unequal income distribution (Great
Expectations, 1990) with a GINI coefficient of .569 in 1988.
In 1982, the Brazilian Government ran out of foreign
reserves.

This ended almost two decades of expansionary

practices and forced the Government to declare bankruptcy.
The international banking community provided emergency
funding, but at a steep cost to Brazil.

The commercial

banks charged a record spread of 2.125% over LIBOR for
public loans and 2.5% for private loans.

The new loans

contained a 1.5% front end fee plus other fees and
commissions, a floating interest rate, and a 1% penalty for
late payments.

In addition, the IMF demanded that the

government decrease subsidies, accelerate devaluation of the
cruzeiro, eliminate indexation of wages, increase interest
rates, and enact wage cuts.

To meet the new payment

schedule, Brazil had to increase her trade surplus from
$6 billion to $12-13 billion in three years.

Exports needed

to increase by 12% while imports fell by $24 billion.
(Roddick 1988, 125-127)
$110 billion.

By 1986, Brazil's debt stood at

Experts contend that 70% of the total

represented interest on old loans.

Capital flight had

consumed 13% and 65% was owed by state companies.

Chart 3.1
BRAZIL' S DEBT BURDEN 1978 -86

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

GROSS FOREIGN
DEBT (U.S.
MILLION)
$ 52,187
$ 55,03
$ 64,244
$ 73,963
$ 80,364
$ 93,556
$102,039
$103,283
$110,572

DEBT AS A %
OF EXPORT
EARNINGS
391
359
320
313
414
404
353
368
386

SERVICE OF
DEBT AS % OF
EXPORT EARNINGS
25.5
31 .5
34 .5
40.5
57.1
43.5
39.7
40.0
37.0

Source: Boletin do Banco Central do Brazil.
1988,128)

(Roddick

Despite the high debt, growth continued and Brazil
recorded positive trade surpluses.

The IMF austerity

measures created a recession, primarily affecting the poor.
Inflation

eroded real wages, already cut under IMF

conditionality.

Corruption and graft dominated regional and

national politics and Government leaders did not make
structural adjustments, believing the fiscal problems to be
temporary.
When President Fernando Collor de Mello assumed office
in 1990, he took an "all or nothing approach" to
obliterating Brazil's inflation spiral.

He likened it to

"driving a packed bus at 150KM per hour, headed for a
cliff... either we put on the brakes and some people get a
little bruised up, or we go over the edge and we all die!"

(U.S. News and World Report 1990).

The result four years

later...everyone is bruised up and the bus is still speeding
out of control toward the cliff.

President Collor's

economic reforms have been unsupported by necessary
structural and monetary changes and have been applied too
inconsistently to have much positive impact on the existing
In March 1990, the Collor government implemented a
severe stabilization program.

Prices were frozen, an 18

month ban was placed on the withdrawal of bank deposits over
$1,200 in savings accounts and $600 in overnight deposits,
inflation was declared non-existent, a new currency was
created, and the government initiated the sale or closure of
188 state-owned industries.

Collor's reforms initially

slowed the rate of inflation .

However, economic growth

fell and unemployment jumped as the government eliminated
public sector jobs and froze credit. In response to pressure
from anxious citizens and irate business leaders, the
government prematurely released a large portion of the
assets and by the end of 1990, inflation was up to 90% a
month.
A second attempt at reform was initiated in January
1991.

Wages and prices were frozen and withdrawals from

overnight accounts were heavily taxed to discourage
consumption.

The speed of privatization was increased and

the government further reduced the size of public sector
employment by eliminating another 200,000 federal jobs
(World Bank 1991, 56) .

Failure to reduce the structural

deficit, intermittent tightening and loosening of the
monetary policy, unfreezing of prices and wages by the third
quarter, and unfreezing the remaining assets led to the
reappearance of inflation.

This also led to a loss of

credibility in the government's ability to control the
economy.

Corruption allegations and charges of

mismanagement forced President Collor to resign and he was
later impeached by the Brazilian Congress.
Brazil's foreign debt is currently $120 billion, 30% of
GDP.

Brazil stopped payments in July 1989 and accrued $9

billion in interest arrears.

Payments resumed in January

1991 at a reduced rate of 30% of the interest payment due.
In April 1991, Brazil reached an agreement with the
commercial bank creditors to pay 25% of the outstanding
arrears in cash and to issue 10-year bonds to cover the
remainder of the debt.

In March 1993, Brazil paid

commercial banks a total of $170 million in overdue
interest, one half of the amount due.
two payments.

This was the first of

The second payment was conditional on a 95%

commercial banks endorsement of a debt reduction package.
Under the conditions of the proposed package, Brazil would
pay the banks $44 billion (of the $102 billion owed), the

banks would forgive 35% of the total owed, and would extend
the terms over a period of 20 years. In September, the banks
agreed to reschedule $35 billion of the outstanding
debt--contingent on an (another) agreement with the IMF on a
new stabilization/austerity plan; forgive a portion of
the loan; and issue bonds with a 30 year maturity period.
With 95% concurrence, Brazil has issued the second interest
payment plus an additional 10% in overdue interest payments
(New York Times 1993, D6) .
Cardoso, Brazil's new foreign minister, proposed
another round of reforms.

In August 1993, he called in $40

billion in debts owed by the states.

Central bank

regulations were amended to prevent banks from being coerced
into lending beyond their means.

He has also squeezed tax

evaders to collect delinquent revenues and now wants to
revise the constitution to simplify the tax code.

In

September, he outlined a four part program calling for:
rapid privatization; price, wage, and exchange rate freezes
for two months; a balanced budget, including tax reform and
effective control of the public sector; and a targeted
anti-poverty program.

The constitutional convention, called

in October, plans to include inflation fighting provisions;
loosen state control on the telephone, mining, and energy
industries; and amend the tax code.

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS:
DEBT REDUCTION/FORGIVENESS: Between 1978-90, 14 OEDC
countries cancelled more than $2 billion of concessional
debt (mostly under Paris Club auspices).

OEDC nations also

gave recipients concessional aid to buy commercial bank debt
instruments at heavily discounted prices.
RESCHEDULING DEBT: Paris Club nations can cancel or
reschedule only official bilateral debt owed over a period
of 15-18 months.

Commercial Bank debt is usually only

rescheduled on a case by case approach when a country can no
longer meet its debt servicing obligations.
BUY BACKS: Commercial banks, desiring to extract
themselves from LDC debt, sell their loans to the secondary
market.

The financial markets believe that the debts are

unlikely to be repaid in full and the value of the loan is
marked down.

The discounted rate reflects the percentage

expected to be paid on each outstanding dollar of debt.
Once the debt has been sold to the secondary market, the
banks no longer accrue any benefits if the country repays or
buys back its loan.

SECONDARY MARKET RATES-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica

.18
.11
.32
.64
.60
.14

Cote d'Ivoire
Ecuador
Jamaica
Mexico
Morocco
Nigeria

.06
.14
.42
.44
.44
.24

(BAKER 17)

Peru
Philippines
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Sudan
Zaire

.04
.54
.55
.40
.54
.02
.19

Source: Nafziger 1993, 3
A heavily indebted country often loses from buying back
part of its debt on the secondary market.

The market price

of debt increases as the outstanding debt falls.

However,

Mexico and Argentina have been successful with privatization
efforts and have bought back a portion of their outstanding
commercial debt on the secondary market.
DEBT-FOR-NATURE: Debt is exchanged for preservation of
natural habitat.

In 1986, Conservation International bought

$650,000 of Bolivian debt using a $100,000 grant.

Bolivia

agreed to protect four million acres of tropical forest
land, guarantee the status of each acre, establish an
endowment fund of $250,000 to manage the Beni Biosphere
reserve, and use Conservation International advisors as
consultants.

Other Debt-for-Nature proposals have been made

to protect the rain forests in Brazil.

DEBT EQUITY SWAPS: Involve an investor exchanging, at
the debtor country's central bank, the country's debt
purchased at a discount in the secondary market for local
currency.

This currency is to be used in equity investments

within the country and is subject to the country's laws on
foreign investment.
INTERNATIONAL DEBT FACILITIES

(Theoretical)

Jeffery Sachs advocates that the mechanism best suited
for the task of debt reduction is the establishment of an
International Debt Facility (IDF) which would work in
conjunction with the World Bank.

Its primary function would

be to buy up medium and long term debt from the commercial
banks at rates approximating their secondary market
valuations. Debt owed to official creditors (IMF) or owed by
the private sector would not be included in this type of
arrangement.

The IDF would then pass this discount to the

debtor nations. For example, if the IDF bought $80 million
in Mexican debt for $40 million they would cancel half of
the debt by either cutting the principal or reducing the
interest rate to one-half of the market rate of the loan.
Countries, however, would not be guaranteed relief
identical to the secondary market valuations.

Instead, the

IDF could work in conjunction with the World Bank.

The

World Bank possesses the needed developmental strategy

expertise and objectivity to help determine, case by case,
what percentage discount should be made.

The discount would

take into consideration the country's ability to pay and the
economic reforms.

They could also provide incentives to the

countries to fund worthwhile programs.

In particular, it

has become increasingly obvious that the destruction of the
rain forest is not a regional issue, but a cause for
world-wide concern. Therefore, in exchange for the
preservation of land the IDF could agree to further discount
a country's loans.

Other programs that the IDF could

consider giving discounts for are: human rights advances;
cholera reduction programs; and literacy campaigns.
The major technical problem with the establishment of
the IDF is how to guarantee bank participation and prevent
free riding.

The solution to this problem is relatively

simple and would not involve mandatory participation.

The

banks are not interested in remaining in Latin America for
the long term. Given the right incentives, their
participation would be voluntary.

The main reasons

countries have not already defaulted on these loans is due
to pressure from the various governments and the policy of
the IMF to discontinue lending to countries in arrears on
their payments.

Simply removing this pressure and giving

tacit support to default on loans to banks that refuse to
participate in the IDF, would go a long way in getting the

banks support. The new loans through the Debt Facility would
take precedence over all other loans.

Part of this

incentive would have to include changing the United
State's present accounting regulation to allow the banks to
gradually amortize the loss incurred by discounting the debt
to the IDF.
The problem then becomes which secondary market values
to use.

If we use the current figures, countries have an

incentive to lie and drive down the market price.

To

prevent this the IDF could use a 12 month average of the
secondary rates.

The banks and debtors who want to

participate would have to do so from the onset to avoid
manipulation of the market and exclude free riders.

The

International Debt Facility would buy the debt by using the
cash raised from issuing bonds guaranteed by the creditor
governments.

Cash flows from interest payments of the

debtor countries would be used to service the b o nds.

By

reselling the debt at a slightly higher rate than what the
IDF bought it for would allow the institution to make
profits on some countries and protect itself from losses on
others.
Participation in financing the facility would include
at least the GATT-7 and more than likely all 24 countries in
the OECD. The amount of capital required to guarantee the

bonds would be quite small when spread across numerous
countries. According to Jeffrey Sachs, with only GATT-7
participation it would take as little as 4% of the United
States' foreign aid appropriation to finance the U.S. share
and "would clean up the commercial bank debt crises for 25
countries."

(Sachs, 1989)

Commercial banks have largely been unaffected by the
debt crisis.

Why should they suffer now?

The IDF would not

be making the banks take new losses, but would force them to
recognize their existing losses.

Banks that choose to

remain heavily involved in Latin American debt sacrifice
possible future gains in new capital markets.

As long as

the present value of the money they receive is greater than
the future value of the loans then the banks are actually
getting a good deal.
Many economists suggest that these debtor countries are
already on the downside of the Laffer curve, so the debt
acts as a high marginal tax rate on the country.

If the

country succeeds in doing better than expected, the main
benefits accrue to the creditors.

That would make the

debtors less willing to take painful or politically
difficult measures to improve economic performance.
Investment is also hampered since capital is so heavily
taxed (Frenkel, 1989) .

If the debtor countries perceive

they are not likely to borrow more and haven't been able to

get voluntary lending since 1982, they will have a strong
incentive to default.

It is in the banks interest to reduce

the debt owed and move back along the Laffer curve.

This

would increase the likelihood of being paid.
Finally, the banks' lending practices are a large part
of what created the crisis and should be forced to accept at
least part of the consequences.

Commercial banks loaned

freely in the 1970s because, as Citicorps' Chairman Walter
Wriston put it, "Sovereign nations do not go bankrupt."
(Madrid, 1990)

The banks are responsible for the loans and

how the money was spent.

Also a question exists on how much

of this debt was acquired through legitimate m e a n s .

When

Mexico rescheduled its debt the first time, not only did the
banks refuse to grant the debtor nations any concessionary
loan terms, they also demanded increased premiums due to
increased risks.
1990)

The bank fees were $260 million.

A U.S. banker put it best,

unethical as can be.

(Madrid,

"It is perfectly legal but

There's the corpse of Mexico, and

they're pulling gold fillings out of the teeth."
Critics of the IDF proposal suggest that the debtor
countries could not repay the IDF if they were unable to pay
the commercial banks and the IDF lacks the backbone to
enforce the contracts. This criticism ignores the
flexibility of the IDF.

Its primary concern is not to

profit, but to assist the countries to recover by
substantially reducing their debt burden.

Countries can be

given credit on their debt for undertaking economic reforms
and debt can be rescheduled in times of economic shocks.
The problem of the IDF lacking backbone is not a major
issue since it will have the support of the major world
governments and the World Bank.

The threat of discontinuing

future lending by the World Bank, and worsening of trade
terms by world governments, has proven in the past to be
enough to keep even the most rebellious debtors in line and
should continue to do so into the future.
Creditworthiness in the future is the only troubling
aspect of the International Debt Facility plan.

If the

commercial banks take large losses on these loans, they will
not be eager to lend again.

Although the IDF does not

directly remedy this, an IDF can not be any worse than
current strategies.

Since there has been little voluntary

lending since 1982,the IDF can only improve things by
allowing the debtors to become more viable enterprises.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is not unreasonable to expect the future world
economic system to be concentrated into large regional
"blocks"--the EC, an Asian trading block, and an "Americas"
block.

It is in the interest of the United States to assist

the Latin American region resolve its lingering debt
problems and become a strong trading partner.

The U.S.

needs to adopt an economic policy that promotes stability
and economic growth, not traditional austerity.

Official

policy needs to change the way the banks and multi-lateral
institutions view debt servicing.

A concerted effort to

promote debt reduction versus debt repayment will go a long
way toward assisting the highly indebted countries reduce
their debt-export ratios and encourage growth.
Mexico and Argentina have made tremendous progress in
the last four years and provide a model for the countries
just beginning the painful process of individualistic
reforms. The individual Latin American countries must
continue to make macroeconomic reforms to increase revenues
and decrease domestic deficits.

Inflation must be kept

under control. Finally, political stability must be a
priority to attract investment and encourage capital growth.

APPENDIX A
A look at some figures of the three countries provides a
starting point to illustrate the differences in each
country's approach to economic reform.
Argentina

Brazil

Mexico

31.9

147.3

84.6

2,160

2,500

2, 080

1.5

2.4

2.0

2.1
-0.5
-4 .6*
-0.7
5.0
6.0
6.5

6.4
2.8
3.6
-4.0*
0.8
-4.5-6.0

6.2
1. 0*
3.1
3.9
4.5
4.0*
5.0-6.0

134
133
140

370
355
358

208 .5
238.2
280.0

Real GDP growth rate
1989
-4.6
1990
-0.7
1991
5.0

3.6
-4.0
0.8

3.1
3.9
4.5

2.4
4.8
4.0

4.0
4.0
4.0

POPULATION
(IN MILLIONS)
1989 PER CAPITA
(U.S.)
POPULATION GROWTH
RATE
GDP GROWTH
1973-80
1980-90
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993 (est)
GDP (in billions)
1989
1990
1991

Unemp1oyment
1989
1990
1991

7.6
8.8
6.4

INFLATION (CONSUMER PRICE INDEX) % PER YEAR
1965-73
24.6
22.7
1973-80
182 .1
43.0
328 .2
1980-88
287.3
1989
4923.0
1764.9
1990
1344.0
1650.0
1991
75.0
382.0

4 .6
20.3
73.8
19.7
29.9
17 .0

1992
1993 (est)
REVENUE -TAXATI ON
CORPORATE
INDIVIDUAL
PROPERTY
CONSUMPTION
OTHER
NON-TAX
EXPENDITURES
DEFENSE
EDUCATION
HEALTH
HOUSING/SOCIAL
SECURITY
TRANSPORTATION/
COMMUNICATION
OTHER

17 .5
5.0-9.0

300.0
390.0

12.0
8.0-10.0

13.2
22.8
8.0
31.3
14 .9
9.9

8.7
15.0
0.8
24.4
3.8
47 .4

1.1
19.3
0.2
57 .3
2.9
10.7

4.5
13.0
4.6
26.6

4.0
4 .8
9.5
34.2

1.4
7.4
1.1
9.3

6.1

3.7

2.7

55.1

53.8

88 .1

TOTAL CONSUMPTION
(PRIVATE /GOVERNMENT)
1973
79.2
(67.3/11.8)
1980
79.4
(66.2/13.2)
1988
79.9
(69.4/10.5)
1989
83.0
(77.3/5.7)
1990
84 .4
(80.5/3.9)

78.0
(57.1/10. 9)
79.9
(67.5/10. 4)
73.3
(69.8/9.2)
71.7
(61.2/12. 1)
77.4
(59.8/11. 9)

79.9
(71.6/8.2)
75.1
(65.1/10.0)
76.7
(68.4/8.3)
76.3
(65.8/10.3)
81.8
(70.4/11.5)

SHARE OF GDP
RESOURCE BALANCES
1980
1985
1987
1988
1989

-5.6
7.2
0.6
4.0
9.3

-2.5
4.7
2.9
4.6
3.1

-5.5
-0.1
-0.5
1.2
0.4

INTEREST PAYMENTS
1980
1985
1987
1988
1989

4 .1
7.7
5.0
3.4
3.6

3.3
4.1
2.5
3.8
1.2

3.1
5.5
5.9
5.0
4.5

1990
CURRENT ACCOUNT
1980
1985
1987
1988
1989
1990
DEBT (1993)
(IN BILLIONS)
DEBT AS A % OF GDP
(1991)

3.0

0.4

3.3

-8.4
-1.4
-5.3
-1.7
-2.2
2.1

-5.5
-0.1
-0.5
1.2
0.4
-0.8

-5.5
0.2
2.8
-1. 4
-2.1
-2.2

62.0

120.0

78.5

69.5

32.3

55.3

Sources: Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade
Practices; The Economist Book of Vital World Statistics,
1990; Fortune, February 1993; and The Economist, February
1993 (* Represents a change in government leadership)

Appendix B
Gross Domestic Investment in Latin America
Investment Index 1980=100
1978-1981
Latin America
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Costa Rica
Chile
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

1982-1987

94

73

88
129
91
99
85
90
93
134
117
98
92
93
94
93
89
91
117

51
64
78
110
70
57
74
85
77
63
69
134
86
85
80
50
74

Source: Calculated from data of ECLAC, Division of
Statistics and Quantatave analysis (Devlin 1989, 219)
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